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A number of studies have examined the extent of access and participation to higher
education, especially among individuals from disadvantaged groups (Kane, 2006).
Much less, instead, is known about the e®ect of institutional selectivity on college stu-
dents' academic performance (Hoxby, 2009). Can admission tests and performance-
based progression schemes select in high-performing undergraduates? Do such poli-
cies have a lasting in°uence over students' entire university careers?
Education research has long established that selectivity is bene¯cial (Thomas,
2003). There is growing evidence, however, that challenges this view, documenting
that more selective universities are not particularly e®ective in fostering learning and
cognitive development during college years (Pascarella et al., 2006). When student
ability is private information and hard to observe, screening | through admission
tests and conditional progression schemes | could in principle provide an e®ective
mechanism to separate high-ability students from low performers (Stiglitz, 1975).
Given the repeated nature of the admission process from one cohort of students to
the next, selectivity can also establish a reliable reputation device through which
high-ability individuals sort themselves into highly selective institutions (MacLeod
and Urquiola, 2009). Despite these arguments, much of the existing evidence about
the link between selectivity and student performance is essentially correlational. The
objective of this paper is to address this issue using unique administrative data from
a leading private University in Italy.
2. Institutional Background
A comprehensive description of the Italian university system is beyond the scope
of this paper (Bratti et al., 2008). Here, we brie°y emphasize two distinctive as-
pects which are relevant to our analysis. First, access to public universities used to
be open and virtually free to all individuals holding a recognized secondary school
quali¯cation | except for speci¯c departments, such as Medicine. This was not the
case, however, for private universities, which, in addition to tuition fees, could have
granted admission on the basis of secondary school test results and/or additional
entry tests. Second, in all public and private universities alike, there was no o±cial
limit to the number of years a student could have been enroled in a speci¯c program
1(Garibaldi et al., 2010). Progression, therefore, was typically not conditional on past
performance, and achievement of the degree was independent of the number of years
spent in a program. For instance, in standard four-year programs, students actually
obtained their degree after 7.5 years on average, with only one in seven students
completing within the minimum period.1
Our objective is to estimate the e®ects of admission tests and conditional progres-
sion schemes on a number of outcomes measuring student performance. In fact, we
estimate the e®ects of interrupting such schemes, taking advantage of variation in the
timing of the interruptions across departments in a large private University. Since
the 1970s, a number of departments within this institution set up selectivity schemes
with the explicit objective of attracting high-performance students. Admission tests
were in-class written examinations that tested candidates' general knowledge. Con-
ditional progression schemes, instead, referred to department-speci¯c rules whereby
students were not allowed to proceed to (and take exams from) a subsequent year of
study, unless they passed all (or a minimum number of) previous years' exams.
In the middle of the 1990s, the sector experienced major changes, with the opening
of several new universities. This process, in turn, led to a massive expansion of the
aggregate supply at the same time when the population exposed to the opportunity
of entering tertiary education was shrinking, because of the pronounced baby bust
occurred since the early 1970s. As a result, the University under study responded
with the gradual elimination of all selectivity schemes, which also potentially implied
e±ciency savings.
During the sample period, admission tests were in operation in the departments
of Economics and Political Science, which discontinued them from 1993/94 onwards,
and in Banking and Finance, which stopped them in the following academic year.
All other four-year programs, which did not have entry tests, de¯ne our control
group. Conditional progression schemes were used by Economics up to 1992/93 and
Mathematics and Physics up to 1998/99, and were never discontinued by Political
Science. All other departments never introduced them.
1The essence of these features | free, low-cost access and uncapped completion period | still
remains to date even after the 2001 reform, which sorted university education into two sequential
tiers of study, three-year undergraduate courses followed by two-year master courses.
23. Data and Methods
We use unique administrative data on 49,157 students, the universe of individuals en-
rolled in all departments o®ering four-year programs between 1990/91 and 2000/01.2
Of these, 35,124 students had obtained a ¯rst degree by August 2008. Figure 1
displays the trends in the four outcome variables analyzed in this paper.3 Students
in both treatment and control groups experienced a reduction in the probability of
graduating from 80% in 1990 to 70% at the time when selectivity policies were still
in place (panel A). Their chances remained stable after the elimination of such poli-
cies. About a quarter of all graduates obtained a degree with top marks in control
departments (panel B), while treatment-group students were only half as likely to
attain this outcome. We observe an acceleration in the proportion of students (in
both groups) graduating within the minimum period of four years, from less than
10% before the policy changes to 25% at the end of the sample period (panel C).
Similarly, the elimination of admission tests accompanied a substantial increase in
the fraction of graduates who obtained their degree within the minimum period and
with top marks from 2{3% among students enroled in the early 1990s to about 10%
among students enroled in the late 1990s (panel D).
Our empirical strategy is based on a di®erence-in-di®erence (DD) design. Tak-
ing advantage of the variation resulting from the di®erent timing of the interruption
of admission tests and conditional progression schemes across departments, we esti-
mate separate linear probability models for each of the outcomes just described. In
all regressions we control for secondary-school ¯nal grade and indicators of gender,
secondary-school type, whether students enroled immediately after secondary-school
completion, and region of residence. We also performed several checks to account for
a variety of time variations. For sake of brevity, we shall present results only from a
speci¯cation with group-speci¯c quadratic trends.
2The start of the sample period is the ¯rst year for which data are available, while the end is
the year prior to the 2001 reform mentioned above. To avoid complications, data collected after
2001 are excluded.
3In the ¯gure, treatment and control groups are de¯ned on the basis of admission test interrup-
tions. Similar trends emerged when we used conditional progression withdrawals, and are thus not
shown.
34. Results
Table 1 presents the DD estimates of the treatment e®ect. The interruption of admis-
sion tests led to a small statistically insigni¯cant reduction of 2.9 percentage points
in the probability of completing a degree. This e®ect is echoed by an even smaller
reduction, of about 0.4 percentage points, due to the interruption of conditional
progression schemes.
Conditional on obtaining a degree, the withdrawal of conditional progression
is always associated with a worsening performance, although this relationship is
never statistically signi¯cant, except in the case of completing the degree within the
minimum period and with top marks (an e®ect, however, that is signi¯cant only
at the 10% level). Removing admission tests is, instead, always associated with
an improved performance, although again this is not signi¯cant in two of the three
outcomes. The outcome with a signi¯cant e®ect estimate is graduating with top
marks: the elimination of admission tests led students to increase their probability
of graduating with top marks by 4.2 percentage points (a 20% increase over the
baseline probability).
We performed several checks to assess the robustness of our results and identify
the presence of heterogeneous responses. In particular, we re-estimated our analy-
sis using group-speci¯c linear trends or, alternatively, common linear and quadratic
trends. We also changed our basic speci¯cation by including a large set of interaction
terms. Finally, we rede¯ned our outcome-speci¯c treatment groups after excluding
sequentially each department in the group. All such tests invariably con¯rmed the
results shown in Table 1. In addition, we found evidence that some of the advanta-
geous e®ect of conditional progression was associated with Economics but not with
other departments, with Economics students experiencing a reduction in the proba-
bility of obtaining their degree by about 4 percentage points after the interruption
of the scheme, and the probabilities of completing within the minimum period and
of achieving the degree with top marks by 8 and 4 percentage points, respectively.
Finally, part of the perverse e®ect of admission tests seemed to be driven mainly by
Banking and Finance, with students from that department showing a 6-percentage-
point increase in the probability of completing their degree within the minimum
time and a 5-percentage-point increase in the probability of completing within the
4minimum period and with top marks, after the elimination of the test.
5. Discussion
The evidence presented in this paper is inconsistent with the long-standing view that
student performance improves when universities adopt stringent selection strategies.
It is important to understand why. We outline two possible, not mutually exclusive,
explanations. First, such strategies might be largely ine®ective in the Italian context,
which was (and, to a large extent, still is) characterized by a sizeable fraction of
high-quality public universities whose undergraduate recruitment was not driven by
selectivity. Institutional selectivity by private universities, therefore, may never be
successfully sustained in such an environment, where public institutions can o®er
a valuable `outside option' to students' enrolment decisions. One weakness of this
line of argument, however, is that selective strategies have been, and continue to be,
successfully adopted by other private Italian institutions which base their recruitment
selectivity exactly on academic performance (Garibaldi et al., 2010).
Second, it is possible that both admission tests and conditional progression schemes
ceased to be e®ective only during their last years in operation because of the change
in environment between then and when they were ¯rst implemented in the 1970s
and 1980s. The 1990s witnessed a phenomenal expansion of the aggregate supply of
university slots, which led to a considerable increase in uncertainty and competitive
pressure felt by all incumbents, including the University under study. The changed
environment seemed to have pushed this institution to a recruitment strategy based
on securing market shares, placing lesser emphasis on selectivity. Also this line of
argument, however, is not entirely satisfactory. Student intake in treatment depart-
ments, in fact, decreased sharply after the interruption of the selectivity policies
while it mildly increased in control departments, even though departments in both
groups had to face greater external competition for students. Moreover, competition
is generally believed to induce positive incentive e®ects rather than fostering bad
practice among educational service providers (Rothstein, 2006).
More generally, in a world characterized by greater uncertainty about student
ability, the presence of selectivity policies might aggravate recruitment problems
on the one hand, but could represent a powerful reputation signal on the other
5(MacLeod and Urquiola, 2009). Concentrating e®ort around such policies, therefore,
could come with short-run costs of reduced student intake, but might pay o® in the
longer-run with greater student quality and increased performance, and, eventually,
better recruitment prospects.
Two points about this discussion are in order. First, the absence of a relation-
ship between institutional selectivity and student performance ties in well with the
growing body of economics literature that emphasizes the importance of early as
opposed to late child investments (Cunha and Heckman, 2010). Within this context,
university selectivity policies are a form of late (and arguably small) investments,
which are thus likely to have little salience on the accumulation of skill formation,
especially if they have not been preceded by earlier crucial investments.
Second, a caveat should be raised on external validity. We cannot claim that
the elimination of selectivity policies has invariably no e®ect on academic quality
and attainment, even in a context within which our institution operated, a context
characterized by dramatic sectoral changes with supply expansions, pronounced re-
duction in the local student population, and heightened uncertainty about student
quality. An alternative way of taking the lack-of-e®ect results forward is to design
simpler and possibly more e®ective selectivity strategies (such as shifting the whole
university system in Italy closer to the Anglo-Saxon model with admissions based on
reliable standardized tests, with progression linked to passing all exams in a given
year as a prerequisite to enrol in the subsequent year of study, and with substantially
fewer exam sessions each year), and to devote more resources to such policies when
they are actually implemented.
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Figure 1: Trends in Educational Performance | All Departments
Note: Solid and dashed lines refer to control and treatment groups, respectively. Vertical lines show when
admission tests were interrupted for Economics and Political Science (dashed/dotted line) and for Banking
and Finance (short dashed line). Control group consists of students enroled in Language and Linguistics,
Education, Law, Modern Literature and Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics.
8Table 1: E®ect of Admission Tests and Conditional Progression Schemes on Academic Performance
Graduating within
Graduating with Graduating within the minimum period
Obtaining a degree top marks the minimum period and with top marks
(All students) (Graduates only) (Graduates only) (Graduates only)
Baseline probability 0.714 0.194 0.111 0.045
A. Admission tests
Treatment e®ect {0.029 0.042* 0.001 0.011
(0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.011)
B. Conditional progression
Treatment e®ect {0.004 {0.023 {0.014 {0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.008)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Other variables included in all regressions are high-school ¯nal grade, linear and quadratic
group-speci¯c time trends, and indicator variables for gender, type of high school (5 dummy variables), whether high-school
was a private institution or not, whether the student enroled immediately after high-school completion or not, and region of
residence (20 dummy variables).
* Statistically signi¯cant at the 0.05 level.
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